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Note
Connecticut v. Mooney: Can a Homeless
Person Find Privacy Under a Bridge?
I. Introduction
"The great end, for which men entered into society, was to
secure their property."1 To achieve this purpose, the framers of
the United States Constitution enacted the Fourth Amendment,
which includes a search and seizure clause and a warrant clause:2
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, pa-
pers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall
not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable
cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describ-
ing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized.'
The Amendment reflects the clash between the individual's pro-
tection of person and property and the necessity of law enforce-
ment for social control.4 Under the Fourth Amendment, the po-
lice cannot conduct a warrantless search of an area in which an
individual possesses a reasonable expectation of privacy. The
clearest example of such an "area" is a person's house or home."
The ideals and principles encompassed by the Fourth
Amendment are currently coming face to face with the era of
1. Entick v. Carrington, 19 Howell's State Trials 1029, 1066 (1765).
2. See, e.g., Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 365 (1967) (Black, J., dissenting),
infra Part II.B.
3. U.S. CoNsT. amend. IV.
4. See Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 525 (1983) (balancing Fourth Amendment
protection of privacy rights against the concept of, and need for, incarceration).
5. See Katz, 389 U.S. 347, infra Part II.B.
6. See, e.g., Entick v. Carrington, 19 Howell's State Trials 1029 (1765), infra Part II.
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homelessness. The homeless do not have a traditional "home".7
Does the Fourth Amendment protect these non-traditional
homes and the person's possessions within? For example, should
homeless persons who build makeshift homes on government-
owned land be afforded the expectation of privacy, and subse-
quent Fourth Amendment protection, normally associated with
a "home?" 8 What if an individual creates a "home" within a nat-
ural cave located on federal lands and lives there for eight
months?9 Does the individual have a reasonable expectation of
privacy in this cave against warrantless searches and seizures? 10
The Connecticut Supreme Court in Connecticut v.
Mooney" was confronted with the issue of the Fourth Amend-
ment rights of a homeless defendant. In Mooney, a homeless
man created a makeshift home under a secluded bridge abut-
ment. The area under the bridge was organized into a living
space and the defendant stored his belongings within a duffle
bag and cardboard box.1 2 The court faced the issue of whether
the defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his
makeshift home, such that his belongings, stored within the duf-
fle bag and cardboard box, were protected by the Fourth
Amendment.
Part II of this Note describes the background of the Fourth
Amendment, beginning with its origins in the English general
warrant and the hated writs of assistance" of colonial America. 4
The Supreme Court decisions which are relied on by the court in
Mooney and the resulting Fourth Amendment jurisprudence are
7. See infra Part II.D.
8. See Amezquita v. Hernandez-Colon, 518 F.2d 8, 12 (1st Cir. 1975), cert. denied,
424 U.S. 916 (1976) (holding that homeless individuals who created makeshift homes on
public land did not have a legitimate expectation of privacy in their homes), infra Part
II.C.3.
9. See United States v. Ruckman, 806 F.2d 1471 (10th Cir. 1986) (defendant lived in
a natural cave on federal land for eight months), infra Part II.C.3.
10. See id at 1472-74. The Tenth Circuit conceded that the defendant had a subjec-
tive expectation of privacy, but decided that society was not prepared to recognize this
expectation of privacy as reasonable. Id.
11. 588 A.2d 145, cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 330 (1991).
12. Id. at 150. See infra Part III.A.
13. See Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476, 481 (1965) ("[t]he hated writs of assistance
had given customs officials blanket authority to search ....").
14. See generally POLYvios G. POLYVIOU, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: CONSTITUTIONAL AND
COMMON LAW 1-20 (1982) (discussing the origin of the Fourth Amendment).
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outlined. Part II also describes the current scope of the home-
lessness crisis as it relates to the Fourth Amendment and to so-
cietal understandings of homelessness. Part III of this Note ex-
amines the unusual facts of Mooney and its majority and
dissenting opinions. Part IV analyzes the reasoning of the major-
ity and dissenting opinions and, in particular, their degree of re-
liance on the defendant's homelessness in assessing the defend-
ant's expectation of privacy within his possessions. Part IV
further explores the issue that the Mooney court declined to ad-
dress: whether a homeless person possesses a reasonable expec-
tation of privacy in an area considered "home." Part IV agrees
with the determination in Mooney that a homeless person has a
Fourth Amendment right in his possessions when such posses-
sions are placed within closed containers and located in an area
that he considers "home." Moreover, Part IV proposes that soci-
etal understandings of the privacy associated with a "home" af-
ford an expectation of privacy to a homeless individual in the
area the individual reasonably considers "home." Finally, Part V
concludes that an expectation of privacy by the homeless in
their "homes" may be considered reasonable if the area is clearly
recognizable by a reasonable person as a home conveying an ex-
pectation of privacy, and should, therefore, be protected by the
Fourth Amendment.
II. Background
The spirit of the Fourth Amendment must be viewed from
its origins. The Fourth Amendment is the only procedural safe-
guard in the Constitution which evolved directly from pre-revo-
lutionary events in England.15 In 17th century England, the
power to search and seize was used by the Crown to restrict the
freedom of the press.' 6 The authority of the government to
search for books and other publications was virtually unlim-
ited. 1 7 General warrants were issued without specifying persons
and places, 8 so that the "seizure of papers and effects was indis-
15. WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIzuRE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
3 (2d ed. 1987) (discussing origin of the Fourth Amendment) [hereinafter LAFAVE].
16. POLYVIOU, supra note 14, at 1.
17. LAFAVE, supra note 15, at 3.
18. POLYVIOU, supra note 14, at 2.
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criminate; everything was left to the discretion of the bearer of
the warrant." '19
The landmark English case of Entick v. Carrington20 deter-
mined the validity of the search and seizure of papers under a
general warrant.2" Entick delineated the fundamental Fourth
Amendment analysis of balancing public necessity with individ-
ual rights.2" The right to privacy in one's home was passionately
argued by William Pitt:2" "The poorest man may, in his cottage,
bid defiance to all the force of the Crown. It may be frail; its
roof may shake; the wind may blow through it; the storm may
enter; the rain may enter; but the King of England may not
enter .... "24 The court found that any invasion of private prop-
erty unsupported by statute, "be it ever so minute . . . and
though the damage be nothing," was determined to be a trespass
under the laws of England.25
Despite the English courts' determination that the right to
privacy in an English home warranted protection, a similar right
had yet to develop in pre-Constitutional America.26 In America,
19. Id., quoting N. LASSON, THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FOURTH AMEND-
MENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION (1937). In the 1760's, the legality of general
warrants of arrest was resolved. English courts determined that general warrants were
contrary to the principles of common law and, therefore, illegal unless authorized by
statute. Id. at 5-6.
20. 19 Howell's State Trials 1029 (1765). See also POLYVIOU, supra note 14, at 6-8
(discussing Entick v. Carrington).
21. POLYVIOU, supra note 14, at 6-7. John Entick had written an unlicensed book,
"The Monitor or British Freeholder." The government considered this book seditious
libel and issued a warrant for Entick's arrest and general warrant for his books and
papers. The general warrant did not specify any particular papers and allowed the mes-
sengers to seize what they wished. Id.
22. Richard G. Wilkins, Defining the "Reasonable Expectation of Privacy": An
Emerging Triparte Analysis, 40 VAND. L. REV. 1077, 1083 (1987) (concluding that the
place or location where surveillance occurs, the nature and degree of intrusiveness of the
surveillance, and the object of the surveillance are the implicit guidelines used by the
Supreme Court in Fourth Amendment cases).
23. William Pitt (1708-78) was a member of Parliament and, for a short time, prime
minister of England. 15 THE WORLD BOOK ENCYCLOPEDIA 453, 454 (1986). He protested
against British policy in the American colonies and defended the rights of the colonists.
Id. at 454.
24. LAFAVE, supra note 15, at 4 (quoting NELSON B. LASSON, THE HISTORY AND DE-
VELOPMENT OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT To THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 49-50
(1937)).
25. Entick, 19 Howell's State Trials at 1066 (Comments of Camden, L.J.).
26. POLYVIOU, supra note 14, at 10.
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writs of assistance were widely used by customs officers to search
buildings for smuggled goods.2 The writs were general standing
warrants which were even more sweeping in scope than the Eng-
lish general warrant.28 Unlike the general warrant, the writ of
assistance did not expire upon execution, but continued in force
until the death of the reigning sovereign.2 ' The massive oppres-
sion inflicted with these writs caused the colonists to challenge
them in court after the death of King George II in 1760.10 Al-
though the court decided against the colonists, the seeds of se-
cession and independence were sown.-" From these seeds grew
the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution of the
United States.
A. The Early American Cases
An early case interpreting and defining the scope of the
Fourth Amendment was Boyd v. United States.32 The majority
in Boyd determined that a forcible entry upon premises or an
actual search for papers need not occur before the Fourth
Amendment was implicated. Relying on the reasoning in En-
tick v. Carrington,4 the majority observed that:
[t]he principles laid down in [Entick] affect the very essence of
constitutional liberty and security. They reach farther than the
concrete form of the case [that is] before the court... they apply
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id. The writs were not specifically meant for one case. ANNE HUSTED BURLEIGH,
JOHN ADAMS 50 (1969) (describing the pre-revolutionary events in colonial America) (ci-
tation omitted). Once the writ was issued, the holder could search any house that he
suspected contained smuggled goods without further permission from a court. Id.
30. POLYVIOU, supra note 14, at 10-11.
31. Id. According to John Adams, "then and there was the first scene of the first act
of opposition to the arbitrary claims of Great Britain. Then and there the child Indepen-
dence was born. In fifteen years, namely in 1776, he grew to manhood, and declared
himself free." Id. at 11 (quoting 10 WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS 247-48 (1856)).
32. 116 U.S. 616 (1886) (importer complied under protest with an order to produce
documents containing proof of guilt under customs revenue statute). Prior to Boyd, Ex
parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727 (1877), held that letters and packages in the mail could not
be opened without a search warrant. Id. at 733. Ex parte Jackson was reaffirmed in
United States v. VanLeeuwen, 397 U.S. 249 (1970). See generally POLYviou, supra note
14, at 14 (discussing the origins and interpretation of the Fourth Amendment).
33. Boyd, 116 U.S. at 630.
34. 19 Howell's State Trials 1029 (1765).
1993]
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to all invasions on the part of the government. of the sanctity
of a man's home and the privacies of life."5
Thus, the Court declared that a substantive right to personal
freedom and security was expressed in the Fourth Amend-
ment. 6 The majority warned that this guarantee from unreason-
able search and seizure must be "liberally construed" to accom-
plish the full protection of the amendment.3 7
Unfortunately, a "liberal" spirit 8 has not always been used
to construe the Fourth Amendment. For example, in Olmstead
v. United States,3 9 the Court held that telephone wiretapping,
unforeseen by the framers of the Fourth Amendment, was not a
search or seizure. Ignoring Boyd's mandate to construe the
Fourth Amendment liberally," the Court interpreted the
Amendment's purpose restrictively.42 The Court relied primarily
on the specific historical origins of the Amendment, namely,
concern over the use of governmental force to search houses and
effects.43 "Reasonableness" was construed in "light of what was
deemed an unreasonable search and seizure when [the Amend-
ment] was adopted.. . ."" The Court reasoned that the Amend-
ment was only violated by a seizure of "tangible material ef-
fects"4 5 and would operate only after an "actual physical
invasion of the [defendant's] house or 'curtilage'48 for the pur-
35. Boyd, 116 U.S. at 630.
36. PoLYVIOU, supra note 14, at 15.
37. Boyd, 116 U.S. at 635. The Court warned:
[i]t may be that it is the obnoxious thing in its mildest and least repulsive form;
but illegitimate and unconstitutional practices get their first footing in that way,
namely, by silent approaches and slight deviations from the legal modes of proce-
dure. This can only be obviated by adhering to the rule that constitutional provi-
sions for the security of person and property should be liberally construed.
Id.
38. See id.
39. 277 U.S. 438 (1928) (government agents tapped defendant's telephone to obtain
incriminating evidence).
40. Id. at 464-65. The Court stated that, "[t]he [Fourth] Amendment does not for-
bid what was done here. There was no searching. There was no seizure .... There was
no entry of the houses or offices of the defendants." Id. at 464.
41. Boyd, 116 U.S. at 635.
42. Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 465.
43. Id. at 465-66.
44. Id. at 465 (quoting Carroll v. United States, 276 U.S. 132, 149 (1925)).
45. Id. at 466.
46. At common law, the curtilage was the area to which the intimate activity associ-
[Vol. 13:229
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pose of making a seizure. '47 In other words, a trespass was
necessary. "8
Olmstead was highly criticized for relying on the law of tres-
pass.49 Yet, subsequent Fourth Amendment cases developed a
two part inquiry relying on the law of trespass: "[(1)] Did the
governmental intrusion occur within a constitutionally protected
place? [and (2)] If so, was the intrusion accompanied by a con-
stitutionally objectionable physical invasion? ' 50 The "constitu-
tionally protected areas" doctrine allowed Fourth Amendment
protection for an individual who was in a place accepted by soci-
ety as an area where privacy should be enjoyed, such as the
home.51 As can be seen from the cases, areas not normally asso-
ciated with privacy were not protected. For example, in Hester
v. United States,52 the Court excepted open fields5" from Fourth
Amendment inquiry because open fields were not areas normally
considered private and did not deserve the "special protection
accorded by the Fourth Amendment to the people in their 'per-
sons, houses, papers, and effects.' ,,54 Since open fields did not
meet the "constitutionally protected place" test, the police could
search without implicating the Amendment's protection.5
ated with the "sanctity of a man's home and the privacies of life" extended and, there-
fore, was considered part of the home itself. Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 180
(1984) (quoting, in part, Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886)).
47. Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 466.
48. POLYVIOU, supra note 14, at 24-25.
49. POLYVIOU, supra note 14, at 25. Justice Brandeis dissented in Olmstead, refer-
ring to the expansive language of Boyd and the purpose of the Fourth Amendment. Olin-
stead, 277 U.S. at 471, 478 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). Noting the 775 typewritten pages of
notes of the overheard conversations, he emphasized that the framers "conferred, as
against the Government, the right to be let alone - the most comprehensive of rights and
the right most valued by civilized men." Id. Although wiretapping was unforeseen by the
framers, a "principle to be vital must be capable of wider application than the mischief
which gave it birth. This is particularly true of Constitutions . Id. at 473.
50. Wilkins, supra note 22, at 1085.
51. POL vIOU, supra note 14, at 25.
52. 265 U.S. 57 (1924). In Hester, the defendant abandoned a jug of "distilled spir-
its" while being pursued by "revenue agents." Id. at 58. The jug was abandoned on his
father's land and the agents picked it up as evidence without a warrant. Id.
53. It should be noted that the term "open fields" is not used as in common speech.
Thus, an open field does not have to be "open" or a "field." It may include any unoccu-
pied or undeveloped area outside of the curtilage. Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170,
180 n.11 (1984), infra Part II.C.2.
54. Hester, 265 U.S. at 58-59.
55. Id. at 59. The Court also noted that "the distinction between the [open fields]
19931
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B. A Revolving Standard - Katz v. United States
Due to new technology and changing societal customs, the
"constitutionally protected area" standard became unwork-
able. 6 A new standard was articulated in Katz v. United
States.57 The Supreme Court ruled that the formulation of
Fourth Amendment issues in terms of "constitutionally pro-
tected areas" was incorrect because it did not reflect the true
spirit of the Amendment.58  The Court held that the Fourth
Amendment protects people, not places: 9
[T]he trespass doctrine [enunciated in Olmstead] can no longer
be regarded as controlling. The Government's activities in elec-
tronically listening to and recording the petitioner's words vio-
lated the privacy upon which he justifiably relied while using the
telephone booth and thus constituted a 'search and seizure'
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.6
Justice Harlan's concurrence clarified the new formula by stat-
ing that "there is a two-fold requirement, first that a person
have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and,
second, that the expectation be one that society is prepared to
recognize as 'reasonable.'"61
and the house is as old as the common law." Id.
56. For example, in Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129 (1942), the Court held
that a Fourth Amendment search did not occur when the government placed a "detecta-
phone" against an outer wall to listen to conversations inside. Id. at 135. But in two
other electronic eavesdropping cases between 1942 and 1964, however, the Court held
that a Fourth Amendment search had occurred. See Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S.
505 (1961) (eavesdropping with a "spike mike" inserted into a wall was a violation of
Fourth Amendment rights); Clinton v. Virginia, 377 U.S. 158 (1964) (listening device
inserted into a wall was a violation of Fourth Amendment rights).
57. 389 U.S. 347 (1967). The defendant was in a telephone booth transmitting wa-
gering information when the F.B.I. attached an electronic listening device and recorded
his conversation. Id. at 348. The Court held that the defendant's Fourth Amendment
right against unreasonable searches and seizures had been violated. Id. at 353.
58. Id. What the defendant "sought to exclude when he entered the booth was not
the intruding eye - it was the uninvited ear." Id. at 352.
59. Id. at 353.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). Justice Harlan later expressed reservation
about the subjective prong, stating that analysis under Katz "must ... transcend the
search for subjective expectations.... [W]e should not, as judges, merely recite the
expectations and risks without examining the desirability of saddling them upon soci-
ety." United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 786 (1971) (Harlan, J., dissenting). In Hudson
v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 525 n.7 (1984), the majority reflected upon, and agreed with,
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol13/iss1/7
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C. Post-Katz Cases - Applying the "Liberal" Spirit More
Restrictively
The Supreme Court continued to apply the Katz reasonable
expectation of privacy standard, but began to limit the reach of
the standard. The application of the Katz standard to the
Fourth Amendment doctrines concerning closed containers and
open fields was discussed in Connecticut v. Mooney.2
1. Closed Containers Protection
Traditionally, closed containers were afforded Fourth
Amendment protection. In United States v. Jacobsen," the
Court held that "warrantless searches of effects are presump-
tively unreasonable" 65 because "[a] container which can support
a reasonable expectation of privacy may not be searched, even
on probable cause, without a warrant. '66 Closed containers, such
"[tihe Court's refusal to adopt a test of 'subjective expectation'...." See generally
Wayne R. LaFave, The Fourth Amendment Today: A Bicentennial Appraisal, 32 VML.
L. REv. 1061, 1080 (1987) (stating that the subjective requirement deserves no place in a
theory of what the Fourth Amendment protects).
62. 588 A.2d 145, cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 330 (1991). See infra Part III.B.2.
63. See, e.g., United States v. VanLeeuwen, 397 U.S. 249 (1970) (packages of coins
in the mail); Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727 (1878) (letters in the mail). See also supra
note 32.
64. 466 U.S. 109 (1984) (cocaine found in damaged Federal Express package).
65. Id. at 114.
66. Id. at 120 n.17. The warrant requirement does not apply to closed containers
found within automobiles, if probable cause supports a search of the container. In Cali-
fornia v. Acevedo, 111 S. Ct. 1982 (1991), the Court adopted a "clear-cut rule" governing
automobile searches and eliminated the need for a warrant. Id. at 1991. This holding
represented a narrowing of Fourth Amendment protection for closed containers. Tradi-
tionally, "one has a lesser expectation of privacy in a motor vehicle because its function
is transportation and it seldom serves as one's residence or as the repository of personal
effects." United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 12 (1977) (quoting Cardwell v. Lewis,
417 U.S. 583, 590 (1974) (search of a locked footlocker taken from trunk of an automo-
bile)). Regardless of the diminished expectation of privacy in an automobile, the Court
had previously allowed Fourth Amendment protection for closed containers found during
the search of an automobile. See Chadwick, 433 U.S. at 15-16; Arkansas v. Sanders, 442
U.S. 753, 763 (1979) (holding unconstitutional the search of a locked suitcase taken from
a taxicab's trunk). However, other cases had held that searches of some integral part of
the automobile, such as a concealed compartment under the dashboard or behind the
upholstering of the seats, was permissible. See Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970)
(guns concealed in compartment under dashboard); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S.
132 (1925) (bottles of contraband liquor hidden behind seats). These latter cases were
later "clarified" in United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982) (search of brown paper bag
1993]
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as luggage, are a common repository for one's personal effects.6 7
Therefore, they are associated with an expectation of privacy.68
The type of container has no bearing on the protection it re-
ceives because "once placed within a [closed] container, a diary
and a dishpan are equally protected by the Fourth Amendment.
... [No court, no constable, no citizen, can sensibly be asked to
distinguish the relative 'privacy interests' in a closed suitcase,
briefcase, portfolio, duffel bag, or box."69
In California v. Greenwood,70 the Court lessened the em-
phasis on the subjective expectation prong of Katz in a closed
container.71 In Greenwood, the defendant placed his garbage out
for collection and the police searched it after the refuse collector
picked up the garbage.7 2 Although the defendant had a subjec-
tive expectation of privacy in the contents of his garbage left in
located in trunk of car). In Ross, the Court held that a "probing search of compartments
and containers" within an automobile was reasonable if supported by probable cause. Id.
at 800 (emphasis added). The Court found that a belief that a vehicle was transporting
contraband was sufficient for probable cause. Id. at 823. Thus, the Court determined in
Acevedo that "the time had come" to end the distinction between a container in an
automobile that the police are specifically searching for and one that they happen to
come across while searching the vehicle. Acevedo, 111 S. Ct. at 1991. Moreover, the
Court found that the Chadwick rule had "devolved into ... an anomaly such that the
more likely the police [were] to discover drugs in a container, the less authority they
[had] to search it." Id. at 1990.
67. See Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 752, 764 n.13 (1979) (search of unlocked suit-
case taken from trunk of taxicab).
68. See id. at 762.
69. Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. 420, 426-27 (1981) (finding that there was a rea-
sonable expectation of privacy in search of packages wrapped with green opaque plastic
found within a closed compartment of an automobile). The Court noted an exception to
the closed container rule if the contents of the containers could be inferred from their
outward appearance; that is, if the containers were transparent or otherwise clearly re-
vealed their contents. Id. at 427.
70. 486 U.S. 35 (1988) (search of garbage bags after they were picked up by the
refuse collector).
71. Id. at 39. Katz expressed a two-prong test: (1) the defendant must exhibit a
subjective expectation of privacy; (2) society must be prepared to recognize such an ex-
pectation as reasonable. Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring), supra note 57.
However, in Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517 (1984), the Court noted that its "refusal to
adopt a test of 'subjective expectation' is understandable; constitutional rights are gener-
ally not defined by the subjective intent of those asserting the rights." Id. at 525 n.7. See
also Madeline A. Herdrich, Note, California v. Greenwood: The Trashing of Privacy, 38
AM. U. L. REv. 993, 995 (1989) (criticizing the majority for failing to address social norms
and local law in its evaluation of the defendant's privacy interest).
72. Greenwood, 486 U.S. at 37-38.
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his driveway for collection, the Court held that society was not
prepared to recognize such an expectation as reasonable.73 Rely-
ing on the statement made in Katz that "[w]hat a person know-
ingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not
a subject of Fourth Amendment protection, '74 the Court deter-
mined that the garbage was readily accessible to the public.7 5 As
such, garbage placed outside of the curtilage 7 of one's home was
not afforded the usual "closed container" Fourth Amendment
protection.77
2. The Open Fields Doctrine
In Oliver v. United States, 8 the Court announced that the
open fields79 doctrine established in Hester v. United States80
had not vanished after Katz reformulated Fourth Amendment
inquiry and removed the emphasis on a physical trespass."1 The
Court declined a case-by-case analysis of Fourth Amendment
protection in open fields82 and established a bright-line rule: in-
73. Id. at 39-40. The Court determined that the garbage was outside the curtilage of
the defendant's home, and thus did not fall under the Fourth Amendment protection of
"houses." Id.
74. Id. at 41.
75. Id. at 40 (quoting Katz, 389 U.S. at 351). Not only was the garbage "readily
accessible to animals, children, scavengers, snoops, and other members of the public," id.
at 40, but the defendant had placed it there for the "express purpose of having strangers
take it." Id. at 41 (quoting U.S. v. Reicherter, 647 F.2d 397, 399 (3d Cir. 1981)). Interest-
ingly, the Court notes in a footnote, "[ilt is not only the homeless of the Nation's cities
who make use of other's refuse ...." Id. at 40 n.3. The Court appears to assume that
searching through garbage by the homeless is a well-known social phenomenon.
76. See supra note 46.
77. Greenwood, 486 U.S. at 41. The Court's holding ignores the view that garbage is
a repository of personal effects, as closed containers are traditionally regarded. Id. at 50
(Brennan, J., dissenting).
78. 466 U.S. 170 (1984) (search of a field where marijuana was growing).
79. See supra note 53.
80. 265 U.S. 57 (1924). See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
81. Oliver, 466 U.S. at 184. The Court in Oliver determined that the reasonable
expectation of privacy standard under Katz "did not sever Fourth Amendment doctrine
from the Amendment's language." Id. at 176 n.6. Thus, under the Katz standard, open
fields remained as unprotected by the Fourth Amendment as they had under the earlier
"constitutionally protected place" standard.
82. Id. at 181. The Court stated:
[n]or would a case-by-case approach provide a workable accommodation between
the needs of law enforcement and the interests protected by the Fourth Amend-
ment .... The ad-hoc approach not only makes it difficult for the policeman to
1993]
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dividuals cannot legitimately demand privacy in open fields, ex-
cept in the area immediately surrounding their homes (the curti-
lage).83 Open fields do not provide the setting for those intimate
activities that the Fourth Amendment is intended to shelter
from government interference.8 Clarifying the Katz test, the
Court stated that "[t]he test of legitimacy"s is not whether the
individual chooses to conceal assertedly 'private' activity.8 6
Rather, the correct inquiry is whether the government's intru-
sion infringes upon the personal and societal values protected by
the Fourth Amendment. ' 87 Therefore, society does not regard an
expectation of privacy in an open field as reasonable because of
the non-private nature of open fields.8
Closely related to the open fields doctrine is the abandon-
ment issue. Abandonment occurs when closed containers have
been left by their owners in open fields or areas accessible to the
public.8 9 In United States v. Brown,90 the Fifth Circuit held that
discern the scope of his authority.. it also creates a danger that constitutional
rights will be arbitrarily and inequitably enforced.
Id. at 181-82.
83. Id. at 178.
84. Id. at 179. However, the Fourth Amendment does protect activities in open
fields which may implicate an individual's privacy; an individual does not lose all claims
to privacy when he/she enters a "public" place. Id. at 179 n.10.
85. Id. at 182. The Court has used the terms "legitimate" and "reasonable" inter-
changeably despite the different connotations. See Michael Campbell, Comment, Defin-
ing A Fourth Amendment Search: A Critique of the Supreme Court's Post-Katz Juris-
prudence, 61 WASH. L. REv. 191, 216 (1986) (asserting that use of "legitimate" is based
on the faulty notion that the Fourth Amendment only protects the innocent and desiring
a standard defined by "government conduct which violates a social norm of privacy.").
86. Oliver, 466 U.S. at 182. Steps taken by an individual to protect privacy in open
fields do not make an expectation of privacy reasonable. Id. In Oliver, the defendant
attempted to conceal the marijuana by fencing it in with chicken wire and erecting "No
Trespassing" signs. Id. at 170.
87. Id. at 182.
88. Id. See California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207 (1986); Dow Chemical Co. v. United
States, 476 U.S. 227 (1986). In both of these cases, decided on the same day, the Court
reaffirmed warrantless searches of open fields. In Ciraolo, the Court held a naked-eye
aerial observation of a backyard constitutional, even though the backyard was considered
part of the curtilage. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 215. In Dow, an aerial observation and photog-
raphy of a 2,000 acre chemical plant complex was held constitutional because it was an
open-field, not a curtilage. Dow, 476 U.S. at 228.
89. Connecticut v. Mooney, 588 A.2d 145, 158-59, cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 330 (1991).
90. 473 F.2d 952 (5th Cir. 1973) (police seized suitcase buried under chicken coop on
abandoned farm).
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a suitcase buried in an open field was "abandoned."'" The court
emphasized that the issue was not "abandonment in the strictproperty-right sense, but whether the person prejudiced by the
search had voluntarily discarded, left behind, or otherwise relin-
quished his interest in the property in question so that he could
no longer retain a reasonable expectation of privacy [in that
item]. 9 2
In United States v. Thomas,9s the D.C. Circuit also inter-
preted abandonment. In Thomas, the defendant dropped a gym
bag in the hallway of an apartment building because he knew
the police were approaching."4 The court held that the gym bag
was abandoned, even though the defendant intended to return
for it later.9 To determine abandonment under the Fourth
Amendment, the court focused on the manifested intent of the
person alleged to have abandoned the object.9 Intent can be in-
ferred from "words spoken, acts done, and other objective
facts."9 The court also noted that the "mere act" of placing a
bag on the ground does not constitute abandonment; "[tihe law
obviously does not insist that a person assertively clutch an ob-
ject in order to retain the protection of the Fourth
Amendment."98
The continued viability of the abandonment doctrine has
91. Id. at 954.
92. Id. at 954 n.5 (quoting United States v. Colbert & Reese, 474 F.2d 174, 176 (5th
Cir. 1973)).
93. 864 F.2d 843 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (gym bag dropped in hallway of apartment build-
ing as police approached).
94. Id. at 846-47.
95. Id. The court stated that:
[t]he legal significance of Thomas' acts [was] not altered by the fact that he might
have intended to retrieve the bag later. His ability to do so would depend on the
fortuity that other persons with access to the public hallway would not disturb his
bag while it lay there unattended.
Id. at 846 n.5.
96. Id. at 846.
97. Id. (quoting United States v. Colbert & Reese, 474 F.2d 174, 176 (5th Cir.
1973)). See also St. Paul v. Vaughn, 237 N.W.2d 365 (Minn. 1975) (eyeglass case hidden
under counter at dry cleaners while police were in pursuit deemed abandoned for Fourth
Amendment purposes). In St. Paul, the court stated that "all relevant circumstances
existing at the time of the alleged abandonment should be considered .... " Id. at 370
(quoting United States v. Colbert & Reese, 474 F.2d 174, 176 (5th Cir. 1973)).
98. Thomas, 864 F.2d at 846.
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been questioned recently by the Seventh Circuit.9 9 Relying on
the California v. Greenwood0 0 opinion, the court concluded that
the Supreme Court "chose not to rely on principles of abandon-
ment in its Fourth Amendment analysis, despite the reliance on
that principle by most of the circuit courts .... As a result, the
continued viability of [the] abandonment approach is
questionable."10 1
3. Balancing Interests Under The Fourth Amendment
Determining the reasonableness of an expectation of privacy
where there are no "bright line" rules entails a balancing of in-
terests.102 Two cases concerning warrantless searches of make-
shift homes constructed by homeless defendants were decided
against the defendants under a balancing of interests ap-
proach.103 In both situations, the courts determined that the de-
fendants' status as trespassers outweighed their privacy interests
in their "homes."10' In Amezquita v. Hernandez-Colon,10 5 home-
less squatters built "structures"10 6 on land owned by the Com-
monwealth of Puerto Rico and defied orders to leave. 10 7 The
First Circuit held that the defendants did not have a legitimate
99. See United States v. Hendrick, 922 F.2d 396 (7th Cir. 1991) (search of opaque
garbage bags inside closed garbage cans).
100. 486 U.S. 35 (1988). See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
101. Hendrick, 922 F.2d at 398.
102. See, e.g., Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517 (1984) (unannounced "shakedown"
search of defendant's cell). The Court balanced the "interest of society in the security of
its penal institutions and the interest of the prisoner in privacy within his cell." Id. at
527. The Court concluded that the "right of privacy in traditional Fourth Amendment
terms is fundamentally incompatible" with imprisonment because "society would insist
that the prisoner's expectation of privacy always yield to what must be considered the
paramount interest in institutional security." Id. Thus, the prisoner's expectation of pri-
vacy in a prison cell against unreasonable searches was not a "reasonable" one in the
eyes of society. Id. at 535.
103. See Amezquita v. Hernandez-Colon, 518 F.2d 8 (1st Cir. 1975), cert. denied,
424 U.S. 916 (1976); United States v. Ruckman, 806 F.2d 1471 (10th Cir. 1986).
104. Amezquita, 518 F.2d at 12; Ruckman, 806 F.2d at 1475.
105. 518 F.2d 8 (1st Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 916 (1976).
106. These structures were described by the trial court as "houses, shacks, and sun-
dry structures" built on farmland owned by the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico. Amez-
quita v. Colon, 378 F. Supp. 737, 740 (D.P.R. 1974). The homeless squatters called the
community "Villa Pangola" or "Villa Ibanez." Id.
107. Amezquita, 518 F.2d at 9.
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expectation of privacy in their makeshift homes.'08 In determin-
ing what constituted a "home" for Fourth Amendment purposes,
the court focused on the public location and the illegal means by
which it was acquired. 0 e
In United States v. Ruckman,"0 the defendant had lived in
a cave on federal lands for eight months."' The police con-
ducted a warrantless search of the cave and seized illegal fire-
arms." 2 After the defendant was arrested, the police again
searched without a warrant and found anti-personnel booby
traps."' The Tenth Circuit conceded that the defendant had a
subjective expectation of privacy, indicated in part by his at-
tempt to "enclose" the cave with a crude "door."" 4 However,
the court stated that the real issue was "whether the cave comes
within the ambit of the Fourth Amendment's prohibition of un-
reasonable searches of 'houses.' """ The court determined that
society was not prepared to recognize the defendant's expecta-
tion of privacy as reasonable because a cave is not a "house" and
the defendant was trespassing on public land." 6
D. Homelessness
Homelessness in America is not a new problem, but the size
and scope of the problem are.'1 7 Since colonial times, there have
been homeless persons in America."18 Today, the homeless are
not hidden or out of sight and they know no geographical
108. Id. at 12.
109. Id.
110. 806 F.2d 1471 (10th Cir. 1986).
111. Id. at 1471-72.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 1472.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 1475.
117. See Lauren M. Malatesta, Comment, Finding a Right to Shelter for Homeless
Families, 22 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 719, 720, 746 (1988) (examining the development of a
right to shelter at the state level and concluding that "[c]ourts are necessary to establish
the rights of homeless families, whether the right to shelter is found in a constitutional
provision or in a statute.").
118. GREGG BARAK, GIMME SHELTER. A SociAL HISTORY OF HOMELESSNESS IN CON-
TEMPORARY AMERICA 6 (1992). The author distinguishes among the homeless of colonial
times, those of the industrial period, and those of today. Id. at 6.
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boundaries.119 Estimates of the size of the homeless population
vary from 250,000 to over three million.120 The homeless popula-
tion consists of "men, women, and children of all racial and eth-
nic backgrounds; the urban and rural working and non-working
poor; displaced and deinstitutionalized persons; alcoholics, drug
addicts, mentally ill, and those afflicted with AIDS; physically
abused mothers and their babies, throwaways and runaways,
sexually abused adolescents, . . . migrants, refugees, and Viet-
nam veterans."'' Societal causes of homelessness include unem-
ployment, shortage of low-cost housing, depopulation of state
mental hospitals, 22  and inadequate public assistance pro-
grams. 23 According to one commentator, however, "[t]he imme-
diate event which precipitates homelessness may be any of sev-
eral kinds, ranging from the seemingly trivial to the manifestly
disastrous. In almost every case, however, exile to the streets was
accompanied by a sense of having been pushed to one's limit
and having nowhere else to turn.'1 24 By the end of the century,
the homeless population could reach 19 million persons. 2
5
119. Id. at 33.
120. MARY ELLEN HoMBs, AMERICAN HOMELESSNESS: A REFERENCE HANDBOOK 6
(1990). These figures represent only the literal homeless. There are more than 15 million
persons who are not literally homeless, but who are "housing poor;" that is, persons who
live in substandard housing. See Curtis Berger, Beyond Homelessness: An Entitlement
to Housing, 45 U. MIAMI L. REV. 315, 315-17 (1990-91) (viewing decent and affordable
housing as a right of all Americans which must be recognized through legislation).
121. BARAK, supra note 118, at 4.
122. ELLEN BAXTER & KIM HOPPER, PRIVATE LIVES/PUBLIC SPACES: HOMELESS
ADULTS ON THE STREETS OF NEW YORK CITY 30 (1981) (study of the homeless in New
York City).
123. James K. Langdon II & Mark A. Kass, Homeless in America: Looking for the
Right to Shelter, 19 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 305, 311 (1985) (examining the homeless
problem and concluding that only comprehensive federal legislation can provide the
needed short-term shelter and long-term solution).
124. BAXTER & HOPPER, supra note 122, at 34. The poor, who are most vulnerable to
homelessness, are those who have pre-existing medical, psychiatric, social or vocational
problems. These persons are the most likely to be "pushed out" of the bottom of the
housing market and have the most trouble jumping back in. See Lucie White, Repre-
senting "The Real Deal," 45 U. MIAMI L. REV. 271, 278 (1990-91) (discussing advocacy
against homelessness and the images which have arisen from and infected the concept of
"homelessness"). Even if the homeless desire shelter, their requests are often unmet. The
U.S. Conference of Mayors found that 15 percent of requests for shelter nationwide went
unmet in 1991. Press Conference with U.S. Mayors in Washington, D.C. (Dec. 16, 1991)
(reprinted by Federal News Service).
125. BAXTER & HOPPER, supra note 122, at 34.
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The Stewart B. McKinney Homeless Assistance Act, 126
passed in 1987, formally recognized the problem of homelessness
and attempted to establish a national uniform policy. 127 The
purpose of the Act is to meet the critically urgent needs of the
nation's homeless.128 Title I establishes the general definition of
a homeless person within the scope of the statute: "A person
who: 1. lacks a fixed, regular, and adequate nighttime residence,
or 2. lives in a shelter, an institution other than a prison, or a
place not designed for or ordinarily used as a sleeping accommo-
dation for human beings."' 29 A more descriptive definition of the
homeless is "those whose primary nighttime . . . residence is ei-
ther in the publicly or privately operated shelters or in the
streets, in doorways, train stations and bus terminals, public
plazas and parks, subways, abandoned buildings, loading docks
and other well-hidden sites known only to their users."' 30
126. Pub. L. No. 100-77, 101 Stat. 482 (1987) (codified at 42 U.S.C.A. § 11302(a)
(West Supp. 1992)) (authorizing funds to protect the lives and dignity of the homeless
through various assistance programs and establishing the Interagency Council on the
Homeless).
127. Id. The Act states in its findings that:
(1) the Nation faces an immediate and unprecedented crisis due to the lack of shelter for
a growing number of individuals and families, including elderly persons, handicapped
persons, families with children, Native Americans, and veterans;
(2) the problem of homelessness has become more severe and, in the absence of more
effective efforts, is expected to become dramatically worse, endangering the lives and
safety of the homeless;
(3) the causes of homelessness are many and complex, and homeless individuals have
diverse needs;
(4) there is no single, simple solution to the problem of homelessness because of the
different subpopulations of the homeless, the different causes of and reasons for home-
lessness, and the different needs of homeless individuals;
(5) due to the record increase in homelessness, States, units of local government, and
private voluntary organizations have been unable to meet the basic human needs of all
the homeless and, in the absence of greater Federal assistance, will be unable to protect
the lives and safety of all the homeless in need of assistance; and
(6) the Federal Government has a clear responsibility and an existing capacity to fulfill a
more effective and responsible role to meet the basic human needs and to engender re-
spect for the human dignity of the homeless.
42 U.S.C.A. § 11301(a).
128. 42 U.S.C.A. § 11301(b).
129. 42 U.S.C. §§ 11302-03.
130. BAXTER & HOPPER, supra note 122, at 6-7. Neither this definition nor the defi-
nition in the Stewart B. McKinney Homeless Assistance Act considers the "hidden or
invisible homeless, the prehomeless people, the renters and even the homeowners at risk,
or people who are without a fixed domicile." See BARAK, supra note 118, at 27-28.
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The homeless have two basic problems: a lack of a place to
live; and poverty. The lack of a "home" is devastating; as one
commentator described it:
On a basic, concrete level, a home offers its inhabitants the ability
to sleep comfortably, to eliminate bodily wastes, to bathe, to rest,
to recuperate from illness, to store, prepare, and consume food, to
store belongings (such as clothes, documents, books, and other
items having personal or sentimental value), to entertain oneself
and one's friends, and to communicate conveniently (by mail and
by phone) with others outside the home. For many people, a
home also represents an opportunity to enjoy security (physical
and psychological), personal privacy, and family intimacy (includ-
ing sexual expression and the care of children), and to express
individuality. In sum, a permanent home allows us to exercise
autonomy. 1'
Although the homeless lack a "traditional home," they often
have a "home base." This home base is "one geographical locale,
where one performs the usual functions of sleeping, eating and
living in accordance with one's lifestyle, and a place to which
one, 'wherever temporarily located' always intends to return."'13 2
The homeless are bound together by a number of factors,
such as concerns over the weather, the search for nourishment,
and an "ever-present fear for personal security."' 3 They strug-
gle to fight off "indecencies, indignities, and obscenities" in daily
existence." 4 They often create "communities" where they feel
more secure. 38 These communities exemplify that "homeless-
131. Wes Daniels, Symposium on Law and the Homeless: An Introduction, 45 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 261, 265 (1990-91).
132. Pitts v. Black, 608 F. Supp. 696, 698 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (homeless plaintiff
describing his view of "residence" or "home base").
133. Kevin P. Sherburne, Comment, The Judiciary and the Ad Hoc Development
of a Legal Right to Shelter, 12 HARV. J.L. & Pus. POL'Y 198 (1989) (concluding that
litigation aimed at establishing a federal right to shelter will fail because the scope of the
judiciary's power does not include the ability to create a right to shelter).
134. BARAK, supra note 118, at 7.
135. See, e.g., Jennifer Toth, N.Y.'s 'Mole People' Shun Society in Transit Tun-
nels; Homeless: They've Set Up Small Havens - And Even Communities - In a Neth-
erworld of Dank Rail Passages, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 2, 1990 at 1 (describing the communi-
ties of homeless who live together in the subway tunnels); Thomas Morgan, A
Shantytown Society Grows in the Shadow of Skyscrapers, N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 20, 1991 at 1
(describing homeless encampments where the homeless choose to live because shelters
are too dangerous).
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ness is not a trait, or an impairment, or even a social deficit. It is
rather a circumstance, arising from a variety of causes, that
presents a problem to be solved: 'where to stay that night?' "136
An alternative to the streets is local shelters. Local shelters,
however, are intended for short-term use only.' Indeed, the
conditions are often deplorable at best."8' In many shelters, the
homeless are checked for drugs and weapons.' They shower
and sleep side-by-side with people they neither choose nor
trust. "" For example, one description of a public shelter by a
study on the homeless reads:
Beds are arranged in four long rows, each stretching the length of
the room. Each bed is separated from the adjacent one by a metal
locker. Many of the doors to the lockers... were sprung, making
the key paying customers receive at the desk useless .... The
mattresses are, without exception, black with dirt and grime,
pockmarked with the burns of innumerable cigarettes, and torn
so that the stuffing protrudes .... It was too dark to see whether
the bedding was louse-infested."'
In fact, shelters are often avoided by the homeless except in
the harshest of weather."" According to one observer, "that's
why people sleep under bridges, to get [their] privacy back."' 3
136. BARAK, supra note 118, at 29-30. The homeless are often viewed as products of
their own individual faults or actions. In periods of housing crisis, these "victim focused"
policies "shift the blame for unfair housing allocation from market failure to personal
fault." White, supra note 124, at 298-99. "We wonder about [the homeless person's]
symptoms, his history, why he can't hold down a job, why he would never 'make it.'" Id.
Although "it is all too common to search for the causes of this growing problem in such
personal problems as divorce, desertion and 'personal misfortune,' . . . homeless[ness] is
much more pervasive than personal failings." David Christiansen, Legislative Homeless-
ness, L.A. TiMEs, Dec. 30, 1991 (Metro), at 5.
137. Langdon & Kass, supra note 123, at 316-17.
138. See, e.g., BAXTER & HOPPER, supra note 122, at 52-55.
139. John H. Kennedy, Is a Homeless Man's "Home" His Castle?, THE BOSTON
GLOBE, Jan. 13, 1991, at 29 (quoting Stewart Guernsey, executive director of Second
Home, a provider of low-cost housing in Boston and Cambridge).
140. Id.
141. BAXTER & HOPPER, supra note 122, at 53.
142. See BAXTER & HOPPER, supra note 122, at 35. However, some studies have
found that the homeless positively assess shelters. PETER H. Rossi, DOWN AND OUT IN
AMERICA: THE OmGINS OF Houm33.ssNEss 101 (1989). The studies asserted that those who
consistently use the streets tended to fit one of the stereotypes of homeless as disreputa-
ble in appearance, incoherent, demoralized and depressed. Id. at 103-04.
143. Kennedy, supra note 139, at 29.
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Another author noted the experience of a mother whose family
was in a Salvation Army shelter: "[tihere was no door on the
women's shower and one night I caught a man peeking into the
women's bathroom watching my ten year old daughter.... An-
other time, a woman accused my daughter of trying to push her
down the stairs.... The woman was mentally disturbed."1 " Not
surprisingly, a study on the homeless stated in its findings that:
"[iut will be seen that in practice, one reason why so many
homeless people prefer the streets to existing alternatives is the
state of existing alternatives. 1
45
The United States Supreme Court has refused to recognize
a fundamental right to shelter for the homeless, stating, "[wie
do not denigrate the importance of decent, safe and sanitary
housing. But the Constitution does not provide judicial remedies
for every social and economic ill. We are unable to perceive in
that document any constitutional guarantee of access to dwell-
ings of a particular quality.
1 46
III. Connecticut v. Mooney
A. The Facts
The defendant, David Mooney, had been homeless for over
one month.14 7 He had first camped beside a fence near the
Trumbull Street entrance to Interstate 91 in New Haven. 148 Af-
ter two weeks, he left to search for a more private location when
another homeless man began sleeping nearby.1""
The defendant settled under a bridge abutment.1 50 Al-
though the land was owned by the State Department of Trans-
portation, the defendant considered this area to be his
"home." 5 ' The bridge abutment was underneath a highway pass
144. JAMES D. WRIGHT, ADDRESS UNKNOWN: THE HoMELEss IN AMERICA 5 (1989).
145. BAXTER & HOPPER, supra note 122, at 7.
146. Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 74 (1972) (due process and equal protection
challenge to state eviction statute).
147. Connecticut v. Mooney, 588 A.2d 145, 151, cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 330 (1991).
The defendant had previously lived in an apartment in New Haven, Connecticut. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Brief for Defendant-Appellant at 11, Connecticut v. Mooney, 588 A.2d 145
(1991) (No. 13737) [hereinafter Brief for Defendant-Appellant].
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by the State Street entrance ramp to Interstate 91 in New Ha-
ven.1612 The abutment was secluded; it was separated from the
ramp by a steep embankment of crushed stone and heavy under-
brush. 5 During the month the defendant lived under the
bridge, he was the sole occupant.' He left the area during the
day and returned at night.155 Concerned about theft, he secured
his belongings so that they would not be seen from the bottom
of the embankment.'15 The defendant was aware that anyone
else could enter the property and, in fact, was once startled by a
state highway worker clearing brush. 57 At night, the defendant
slept behind a bush.158
The defendant owed money to Mark Allen for drugs.5 9 On
July 30, 1987, he and Allen went to an acquaintance's condomin-
ium on the pretext of a sexual tryst. e0 Once there, the defend-
ant strangled the acquaintance, and he and Allen burglarized
the residence. 16' Allen stole the victim's car and was picked up
by the police on August 5, 1987.16" After questioning Allen, the
police secured an arrest warrant and arrested the defendant.'"3
While the defendant was in custody, the police travelled to the
defendant's "home" under the bridge to search for evidence con-
necting the defendant to the crimes.'" No search warrant was
152. Brief for Defendant-Appellant, supra note 151, at 3.
153. Id. ("This area was not readily visible or accessible.").
154. Id. at 9.
155. Mooney, 588 A.2d at 151.
156. Brief for Defendant-Appellant, supra note 151, at 3-4. In the suppression hear-
ing, the defendant-appellant explained, "I always checked [the area under the bridge]
because I was worried that... somebody might steal them, so I always made sure when
you looked up there you couldn't see [my items]." Id. at 8A.
157. Mooney, 588 A.2d at 151.
158. Brief for Respondent in Opposition to Petition For Writ of Certiorari, Connect-
icut v. Mooney, 218 Conn. 80, 588 A.2d 145 (No. 90-1887), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 330
(1991) at 6 (brief submitted to the United States Supreme Court) [hereinafter Brief for
Respondent].
159. Mark Allen was arrested and convicted in Connecticut v. Allen, 579 A.2d 1066
(1990).
160. Mooney, 588 A.2d at 149.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 150.
163. Brief for Defendant-Appellant, supra note 151, at 2-3.
164. Id. at 3-4. The police contacted Linda Spencer, the defendant's girlfriend, who
led the police to the area under the bridge. Id.
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issued.165 On the ground under the bridge, the police found a
blanket used as a mattress, a small closed duffle bag, and paper
trash. 6 The defendant's belongings were "either rolled or pack-
aged closed" and were "stored, . . . not strewn about at all.' 6 7
The defendant had placed a rolled-up sleeping bag, a cardboard
box, and a suitcase on the cement and metal beams of the high-
way support structure, using them as shelves. 168 Opening the
duffle bag, the police found a large quantity of coins.6 9 They
then removed all of the items and brought them to the police
station. 17 0 Again without a warrant, the police searched through
the defendant's belongings.17 ' The cardboard box contained a
size thirty-eight belt. 7 The duffle bag also housed a pair of
bloodstained pants and several pieces of jewelry. 73
The belt and bloodstained pants obtained from the warrant-
less searches were used at trial to connect the defendant to the
crime. 17 "4 The trial court determined that the defendant had ex-
hibited a subjective expectation of privacy in the items, stating,
"[tihere's no doubt . . . he intended that his property not be
searched and seized. He did make an effort to secrete these
items or hide them .... Certainly ... his subjective intent was
not to have anyone seize those items.' 7 5 However, because the
belongings were located under the bridge, the defendant's sub-
jective expectation of privacy in them was held unreasonable. 7 6
Consequently, a warrantless "search" as prohibited by the
Fourth Amendment had not occurred. 77
The defendant was subsequently convicted of felony murder
165. Id. at 4.
166. Mooney, 588 A.2d at 150.
167. Id. at 151 n.7 (quoting testimony of the detective who went to the area under
the bridge).
168. Id. at 150.
169. Id. The bag was later determined to hold $700 worth of coins. Id. at 151.
170. Id. at 150-51. The court noted that the search did not fall under the inventory
exception to the warrant requirement. Id. at 151 n.6.
171. Id. at 151.
172. Id. at 151-52.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 151.
175. Brief for Defendant-Appellant, supra note 151, at 8.
176. Mooney, 588 A.2d at 151.
177. Brief for Defendant-Appellant, supra note 151, at 9.
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and robbery in the first degree.1 78 The issue presented for appeal
to the Supreme Court of Connecticut was whether the defendant
had a reasonable expectation of privacy, protected by the Fourth
Amendment, in his "home" under the bridge abutment and in
the closed duffle bag and cardboard box located under the
bridge abutment. 7 9
B. The Majority Opinion
1. The Majority's Assessment of the "Home" Issue
The majority'" "divorced" the defendant's two claims of
privacy as to his "home" and his belongings located within the
duffle bag and cardboard box.181 The first claim, that the police
had invaded the defendant's "home" under the bridge abutment
in which the defendant had an expectation of privacy, was not
decided by the court. 8 According to the majority, this "broad"
claim rested "solely on [the defendant's] homelessness.' ' 183 In
declining to analyze the issue, the court assumed "for purposes
of this decision that the state is correct that the defendant's
broad claim of fourth amendment protection in the area [under
the bridge] must fail.'1 8 4
2. The Majority's Assessment of the "Closed Container
Issue"
The second claim, that the police had invaded the defend-
ant's expectation of privacy in the contents of his duffle bag and
card box, was decided in favor of the defendant.' The majority
asserted that this claim rested upon more than just the defend-
ant's homelessness: "[t]hat is but one factor among several, the
principal ones being the nature of the containers searched and
178. Mooney, 588 A.2d at 149.
179. Brief for Defendant-Appellant, supra note 151, at 6, 12.
180. The court sat en banc.
181. Mooney, 588 A.2d at 152.
182. Id. at 155.
183. Id. at 152.
184. Id.
185. Id. at 161 ("In sum, the defendant retained his reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy in the contents of his duffle bag and cardboard box.").
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the circumstances surrounding their search." '86 The majority fo-
cused on the contents of the closed containers as the "place"
invaded:
although the United States Supreme Court has not specifically
articulated the principle as such, the fourth amendment focus on
the place invaded, when applied to luggage or other appropriate
containers, refers to their interior or contents. Thus, although the
inquiry in determining whether there is a reasonable expectation
of privacy involves an inquiry into the particular place invaded,
when the search is of a piece of luggage the principal "place" for
fourth amendment purposes is the interior of the luggage and its
contents. 18
Thus, an expectation of privacy inheres in the contents of the
container, not the visible exterior or location. 88 The majority
noted the defendant's consideration of the area under the bridge
as his "home," the seclusion of the area, and the "rough-hewn
fashion" by which the defendant maintained the area as a home
as factors important in the determination of his expectation of
privacy in the closed containers.' 89 However, the court carefully
articulated that it was not deciding "whether the fourth amend-
ment protects the goods and effects of all homeless persons, re-
gardless of their particular circumstances.' 190
a. Closed Container Cases'9'
The majority analyzed case law concerning "closed contain-
ers"1 92 and found it to "strongly suggest [that] .. .the weighty
interest in the expectation of privacy in the contents of luggage
[or closed containers housing personal belongings] may be recog-
nized by society under the facts of this case.' 93 However, the
186. Id. at 154.
187. Id. at 157.
188. Id. at 156.
189. Id. at 155 n.12.
190. Id. at 155 (emphasis added).
191. See supra Part II.C.1.
192. See, e.g., Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. 420, (1981), supra note 69 and accom-
panying text.
193. Mooney, 588 A.2d at 158. The majority recognized that "[t]raditionally, great
deference has been afforded under the fourth amendment to the expectation of privacy
in luggage or closed containers." Id. at 156.
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majority concluded that closed container case law was not deter-
minative of the issue under the "unique factual circumstances"
of Mooney.194 The factual circumstances were that the closed
containers were found by the police in a secluded area that they
knew the defendant considered "home," that the defendant's
absence from his "home" during the search was due to his ar-
rest, and that the purpose of the search was to obtain evidence
of the crime for which the defendant was in custody.19 5 In previ-
ous closed container cases, the owner of the container had been
present at time of seizure and search of the containers, 9 ' had
entrusted the containers to another for safekeeping,197 or had
left the containers in an area where the owner had a reasonable
expectation of privacy. 98 Therefore, the majority concluded that
the closed container cases did not compel a conclusion that the
defendant's expectation of privacy was reasonable.'99
b. The Abandonment and Open Field Cases
The majority found that abandonment cases2 °0 supported
the state's assertion that the defendant had no Fourth Amend-
ment interest in the closed containers.2"' The state asserted that
the defendant had abandoned any expectation of privacy in his
belongings when he left them there unattended and that he
"could not reasonably expect that his possessions would remain
shielded from the curiosity of passersby or from the scrutiny of
the police."202 Although the majority ultimately disagreed with
194. Id. at 158. The majority stated that, "[a] close reading of those cases indicates
that they do not resolve the issues in this case." Id.
195. Id. at 155. The majority stated that they believed "society would factor [the
defendant's] absence into its calculus of whether the defendant's expectation of privacy
was reasonable under all the circumstances of the case." Id. at 161 n.17.
196. See, e.g., United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1 (1981), supra note 66.
197. See, e.g., United States v. Jacobson, 466 U.S. 109 (1984), supra note 64 and
accompanying text.
198. Mooney, 588 A.2d at 158 (citing State v. Edwards, 214 Conn. 57 (1990)
(backpack located in apartment)). The majority noted that the location of the containers
(under the bridge abutment) was relevant for Fourth Amendment inquiry into the ex-
pectation of privacy in the duffel bag and cardboard box. Id. at 157 n.14.
199. Id. at 158. See supra Part II.C.1.
200. See supra Part II.C.2.
201. Mooney, 588 A.2d at 154.
202. Id. The defendant had admitted that he knew the area was state property and
that there was no reason why anyone else could not enter or live there. Id. at 151.
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the state, the justices acknowledged the validity of some of the
state's arguments. Turning to Katz v. United States,2 03 the ma-
jority acknowledged that "[w]hat a person knowingly exposes to
the public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of
Fourth Amendment protection. 2 0 4 The majority also agreed
that trespassers ordinarily have no reasonable expectation of
privacy in the place in which they are trespassing208 and that
leaving one's property in an area accessible to the public may
affect the reasonableness of an expectation of privacy in that
property.20' However, the majority found these factors to be
"relevant [only] as helpful guides. ' 207 It emphasized that such
guides were "not [to] be undertaken mechanistically."20 8 The
majority further determined that the factors "are not ends in
themselves; they merely aid in evaluating the ultimate question
in all Fourth Amendment cases - whether the defendant had a
legitimate expectation of privacy, in the eyes of our society, in
the area searched. '209
The majority also emphasized that the test for abandon-
ment under the Fourth Amendment is distinct from that of
property law.2 10 Thus, a person could retain a property interest
in an item while relinquishing a reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy in it.2 1' According to the court, "[tihe test is whether,
under all the facts, the owner or possessor may fairly be deemed
as a matter of law to have relinquished his expectation of pri-
vacy in the object in question, and, where that object is a piece
of luggage, in the contents thereof.212 The majority concluded
203. 389 U.S. 347 (1967). See supra Part II.B.
204. Mooney, 588 A.2d at 153 (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351
(1967)). By the same token, what an individual "seeks to preserve as private, even in an
area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected." Katz, 389 U.S. at 351-
52.
205. Mooney, 588 A.2d at 153-54. See United States v. Ruckman, 806 F.2d 1471
(10th Cir. 1986); Amezquita v. Hernandez-Colon, 518 F.2d 8 (1st Cir. 1975), cert. denied,
424 U.S. 916 (1976), supra Part II.C.3.
206. Mooney, 588 A.2d at 159-60. See California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35 (1988),
supra note 70 and accompanying text.
207. Mooney, 588 A.2d at 154.
208. Id.
209. Id. (quoting Ruckman, 806 F.2d at 1476 (McKay, J., dissenting)).
210. Id. at 158. See supra notes 89-92 and accompanying text.
211. Id.
212. Id. at 158-59. In reciting this test, the majority also determined that the trial
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that the defendant in Mooney attempted to shield his posses-
sions from view and did not manifest a intent to temporarily
relinquish his expectation of privacy in the items.2 13 Thus, the
abandonment inquiry did not compel the majority to decide that
the defendant had relinquished his expectation of privacy in the
closed containers.214
The majority also concluded that the open fields doctrine,
as enunciated in Oliver v. United States,215 did not control the
outcome of the case. 1 In Oliver, open fields were not afforded
Fourth Amendment protection because they were not "effects"
as enumerated in the Amendment and did not provide the set-
ting for the intimate activities the Amendment was designed to
protect.217 In the present case, the closed containers clearly were
"effects" within the meaning of the amendment.2 8
3. The Majority's Return To "First Principles"
The Mooney court returned to "first principles 2 1 9 to decide
the question of whether the defendant had a reasonable expecta-
court had applied an incomplete test. Id. at 159. The trial court had decided that a
reasonable person would have considered the defendant's property to have been aban-
doned. Id. This inquiry is relevant in determining reasonable expectation of privacy, but
does not end the inquiry. Id.
213. Id. at 159-60.
214. Id. The abandonment cases were distinguished on three grounds: (1) none of
them involved a search of the luggage of a homeless man where the police knew the area
searched was his "home;" (2) none of them raised the independent privacy interest in the
contents of the containers; and (3) most of them involved a defendant who exhibited a
temporary intent to relinquish an expectation of privacy in the contents of the contain-
ers. Id. at 159-60. The majority referred to California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35 (1988),
in its discussion of abandonment, although the case was not decided on abandonment
grounds. Mooney, 588 A.2d at 159. The case is distinguished because in Greenwood, the
closed containers (garbage bags) were left at the curb for the express purpose of convey-
ing them to a third party. Id. at 159.
215. 466 U.S. 170 (1984), supra note 78 and accompanying text.
216. Mooney, 588 A.2d at 159.
217. Id.
218. Id. at 160.
219. The majority stated: "[w]e return, therefore, to first principles in order to re-
solve the question ...." Id. See, e.g., Oliver, 466 U.S. at 178 (Powell, J., concurring)
(citing United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1 (1977) ("[iln assessing the degree to which
a search infringes upon individual privacy, the Court has given weight to ... the inten-
tion of the [FIramers [sic] of the [F]ourth [A]mendment[,J . . .the uses to which the
individual has put a location ... and our societal understanding that certain areas de-
serve ... protection from government invasion.").
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tion of privacy in the cardboard box and duffle bag.2 ° In doing
so, the majority considered societal values and customs, the loca-
tion of the luggage under the bridge on public land, and the sta-
tus of the defendant as a trespasser."' Consequently, the major-
ity reached four conclusions: (1) the place searched was the
interior of Mooney's closed duffle bag and cardboard box; (2) the
containers were located in a place that the defendant regarded
as his home and the police were aware, of this when they
searched it; (3) the defendant could not assert his Fourth
Amendment rights regarding the containers because he was in
custody; and (4) the purpose of the search was to gather evi-
dence, not to safeguard the luggage or identify the owner. 2 2
These conclusions supported the majority's finding that the de-
fendant's expectation of privacy in his duffle bag and cardboard
box was reasonable.22 s Specifically, the court announced:
We believe that under these particular circumstances, society's
code of values and its notions of custom and civility would cause
it to recognize as reasonable the defendant's expectation of pri-
vacy in his duffle bag and cardboard box. The interior of those
two items represented, in effect, the defendant's last shred of pri-
vacy from the prying eyes of outsiders, including the police. Our
notions of customs and civility, and our codes of values, would
include some measure of respect for that shred of privacy, and
would recognize its assertion as reasonable under the circum-
stances of this case.2 24
C. The Dissent
The dissent did not "divorce" the issues of the defendant's
expectation of privacy in the area under the bridge and in the
closed containers.225 The dissent argued that "the defendant had
220. Mooney, 588 A.2d at 160.
221. Id.
222. Id. at 160-61.
223. Id. at 161.
224. Id. The majority also buttressed its opinion with a balancing test, weighing
society's interest in law enforcement against Mooney's expectation of privacy in his lug-
gage. The majority concluded that the defendant's interest outweighed that of society.
Id.
225. Id. at 172 ("Unlike the majority, I cannot divorce the analysis of the container
issue ....") (Callahan, J., dissenting).
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no reasonable expectation of privacy in the area under the
bridge... [and] ... could not have reasonably expected that the
contents of his containers would remain inviolate if left there
unattended. 2 2' 6 The dissent concluded that the defendant's ex-
pectation of privacy in the area under the bridge and the con-
tainers was unreasonable because a bridge abutment is a public
place, readily accessible to anyone.2 27
The dissent applied what it termed a "realistic assessment"
of the circumstances and likelihood that Mooney's privacy inter-
est might have been invaded.2 8 It referred to the majority's reli-
ance on the defendant's privacy interest in the interior of the
containers as "puzzling."229 Instead, the dissent focused on the
location of the containers under the bridge and the defendant's
status as a trespasser on public land.2 -0 The dissent determined
that the defendant need not indicate an intent to relinquish his
expectation of privacy in the duffle bag and cardboard box for
the possessions to be deemed "abandoned.
23 1
Citing California v. Greenwood,2 the dissent emphasized
that the accessibility of the duffle bag and cardboard box to
members of the public was the predominant factor in its Fourth
Amendment analysis. 2 33 The defendant's status as homeless did
not affect the dissent's determination that the defendant had no
226. Id. at 172-73.
227. Id. at 171-72. According to the dissent: "[A] common thread that unifies the
intricate and often confusing legal patchwork of fourth amendment case law [after Katz
v. United States], . . . is that '[w]hat a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in
his own home, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection.'" Id. (quoting Katz v.
United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967)). The dissent also cited to United States v. Ruck-
man, 806 F.2d 1471 (10th Cir. 1986) (defendant who lived in a cave for eight months had
no reasonable expectation of privacy) and Amezquita v. Hernandez-Colon, 518 F.2d 8
(1st Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 916 (1976) (squatters had no reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy). See supra Part II.C.3.
228. Mooney, 588 A.2d at 175 (Callahan, J., dissenting).
229. Id.
230. Id. at 172, 175.
231. Id. at 175. The dissent concluded that the defendants in the abandonment line
of cases attempted to "hide" their possessions in public places, yet their expectations of
privacy were held unreasonable. Id. See United States v. Brown, 473 F.2d 952, 954 (5th
Cir. 1973); United States v. Thomas, 864 F.2d 843, 846-847 (D.C. Cir. 1989), supra Part
II.C.2.
232. 486 U.S. 35 (1988), supra note 70 and accompanying text.
233. Mooney, 588 A.2d at 175 (Callahan, J., dissenting).
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reasonable expectation of privacy in the closed containers."' 4
The dissent believed that:
[t]he upshot of the majority's reliance on this fact . . . that the
defendant was homeless and that the police knew that [he consid-
ered this area to be his home, is that] a homeless person who
leaves his belongings in containers under an abutment receives
greater protection ... than would a person who had a home but
placed articles there for other reasons.23
The dissent concluded by stating, "I believe that the majority
has allowed the current publicity and concern for the plight of
the homeless to create an empathy that in turn has created bad
fourth amendment law. '236
IV. Analysis
The majority in Connecticut v. Mooney237 creatively "di-
vorced" the issues of the defendant's right to privacy in the area
under the bridge and his right to privacy in the duffle bag and
cardboard box. 238 By divorcing the issues, the majority was able
to distinguish Mooney from the two factually similar cases of
Amezquita v. Hernandez-Colon 2 9 and United States v. Ruck-
man, 24  neither of which involved the search of a closed
container within the "home. 2 41 The "place" focused on in
234. Id. at 173.
235. Id.
236. Id. at 176.
237. 588 A.2d 145, cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 330 (1991).
238. See id. at 152. The language of the Fourth Amendment supports divorcing the
issues, as "effects" are listed separately from "houses." See supra note 3 and accompany-
ing text. The Supreme Court has traditionally afforded closed containers a high degree of
protection because they are repositories of personal effects and justify a privacy interest.
See California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35 (1988); United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109
(1984); United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1 (1977); United States v. VanLeeuwen, 397
U.S. 249 (1970) (reaffirming Ex Parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727 (1878)). See supra, part
II.C.1.
239. 518 F.2d 8 (1st Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 916 (1976) (squatters built
structures on land owned by Commonwealth of Puerto Rico and defied orders to leave).
See supra notes 104-108 and accompanying text.
240. 806 F.2d 1471 (10th Cir. 1986) (defendant lived in a cave on federal land for
eight months). See supra notes 109-116 and accompanying text.
241. In Amezquita and Ruckman, the circuit courts determined that the defend-
ants' status as trespassers rendered their expectations of privacy in makeshift homes
unreasonable. Amezquita, 518 F.2d at 12; Ruckman, 806 F.2d at 1473.
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Amezquita and Ruckman was the makeshift home itself, rather
than the interior of the closed containers as in Mooney.2 2 The
majority in Mooney focused on the interior of the defendant's
duffle bag and cardboard box as the "place" invaded by the
search in order to find that the defendant had a reasonable ex-
pectation of privacy in the contents of the duffle bag and card-
board box. 243 This place, the interior of the duffle bag and card-
board box, necessitated Fourth Amendment protection because
it represented the defendant's "last shred of privacy from the
prying eyes of outsiders. 24
Thus, the majority in Mooney determined that society was
prepared to recognize the defendant's expectation of privacy in
the duffle bag and cardboard box as reasonable under the unique
circumstances of the defendant's homelessness. 2 " Prior prece-
dent suggests that the duffle bag and cardboard box would have
been determined abandoned if the majority had not considered
the defendant's homelessness.2' 6 Since inquiry under the Fourth
Amendment is fact-specific, an apparently small difference in
the factual setting is often viewed as a controlling difference in
determining Fourth Amendment rights.24 In Mooney, the de-
fendant's homelessness presented a significant factual difference
242. Amezquita, 518 F.2d 8; Ruckman, 806 F.2d 1471.
243. Mooney, 588 A.2d at 157. The majority stated that the exterior, or location, of
the containers was not the focus. Id. at 156. However, recent Supreme Court Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence suggests the opposite; that the reasonableness of the privacy
interest in closed containers is directly related to the place in which they were found.
See, e.g., California v. Acevedo, 111 S. Ct. 1982 (1991) (allowing warrantless search of
closed containers found in automobiles). In the Mooney situation, the place was public
land and the defendant was a trespasser. Mooney, 580 A.2d at 160. Thus, the Mooney
majority took a courageous step in divorcing the issues and holding that the duffle bag
and cardboard box were protected by the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 145.
244. Mooney, 588 A.2d at 161.
245. Id. at 160-61.
246. See United States v. Thomas, 864 F.2d 843 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (gym bag dropped
in hallway of apartment building considered abandoned); United States v. Brown, 473
F.2d 952 (5th Cir. 1973) (suitcase buried under chicken coop considered abandoned); St.
Paul v. Vaughn, 237 N.W.2d 365 (Minn. 1975) (eyeglass case hidden under counter at
dry-cleaners considered abandoned), supra Part II.C.2.
247. Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 757 (1979), supra note 66. Courts and law
enforcement officers often have difficulty discerning the proper application of well-set-
tled Fourth Amendment principles in individual cases because "the circumstances giving
rise to suppression requests can vary almost infinitely." Id. But cf. California v. Acevedo,
111 S. Ct. 1982 (1991) (providing clarification of the rule pertaining to searches of closed
containers in automobiles), supra note 66.
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from other Fourth Amendment decisions which should affect the
reasonableness of the defendant's expectation of privacy in his
makeshift home. Homelessness, therefore, served as a pivotal
factor in the majority's analysis of the duffle bag and cardboard
box, despite the majority's insistence that homelessness is "but
one factor among several. 248
However, the majority did not specifically establish that the
area under a bridge is a "home" necessitating the Fourth
Amendment protection that traditional homes receive.2 49 For a
determination of this issue, the spirit of the Fourth Amendment
must be considered2 5 0 The framers of the United States Consti-
tution passed the Fourth Amendment to protect individuals'
persons and property from governmental search.2 51 The spirit of
the Amendment was to protect the "sanctity of a man's home
and privacies of life. 21 52 Historical origins and Supreme Court
jurisprudence suggest that the Fourth Amendment protects peo-
ple, not places.2 53 The framers of the Constitution knew:
that only a part of the pain, pleasure and satisfactions of life are
to be found in material things. They sought to protect Americans
in their beliefs, their thoughts, their emotions, and their sensa-
tions. They conferred, as against the Government, the right to be
let alone - the most comprehensive of rights and the right most
valued by civilized men.25
To maintain its spirit, the Fourth Amendment must grow with
society; when interpreting the Amendment the courts should
"effectuate [its] purposes - to lend [it] meanings that ensure
that the liberties the Framers sought to protect are not under-
mined by the changing activities of government officials. ' 255
248. Mooney, 588 A.2d at 154. The principal factor was the nature of the containers
searched (that they were a cardboard box and duffle bag containing personal belongings).
The majority also focused on the circumstances surrounding the search (that this was a
search for evidence of a crime when the defendant was already in custody). Id. at 155.
249. Mooney, 588 A.2d at 155.
250. See supra notes 15-24 and accompanying text.
251. See generally, POLYVIOU, supra note 14, at 16 (discussing the background of the
Fourth Amendment).
252. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886). See supra Part II.A.
253. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967). See supra Part II.B.
254. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)
(emphasis added).
255. Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 187 (1984) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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Thus, liberty and privacy were at the core of the Amend-
ment.256 The inquiry into the nature of the protection that the
Fourth Amendment affords the homeless in their makeshift
homes should require reference to a "place" only as needed to
determine the privacy and liberty interests at stake within the
"place." 5 7 As the Supreme Court recently stated, "[t]he sanctity
of the home is not to be disputed. But the home is sacred in
Fourth Amendment terms not primarily because of the occu-
pants' possessory interests in [it], but because of their privacy
interests in the activities that take place within. '2 5 8 One home-
less man explained that: "[t]he most important thing in every
man's life is shelter. Once you have shelter, then you are able to
get yourself together, then you are able to develop the idea of
how you can get yourself out of the trouble you are in."'125
The Mooney dissent's primary focus on the defendant as a
trespasser on public property, as well as the emphasis on the
possibility of another person discovering the defendant's "home"
and possessions,6 0 is contrary to the principle that the Fourth
Amendment protects people, not places. 261 The reference to the
home as a "place" in Fourth Amendment analysis does not im-
plicate property law. 62 The Supreme Court has determined that
principles of property law are distinct from Fourth Amendment
analysis and not determinative of an expectation of privacy.263
As Justice Harlan stated in Katz v. United States, "the point is
not that the [place such as a] telephone booth is 'accessible to
the public' at other times, but that it is a temporarily private
256. See Boyd, 116 U.S. at 630. As the Supreme Court noted, "[ilt is not the break-
ing of... doors, and the rummaging of ... drawers, that constitutes the essence of the
offence; but [rather] the invasion of [the] indefeasible right of personal security, personal
liberty and private property" that violates the Fourth Amendment. Id.
257. See, e.g., Oliver, 466 U.S. at 184 (open fields doctrine). See generally, Michael
Campbell, Comment: Defining.a Fourth Amendment Search: A Critique of the Supreme
Court's Post-Katz Jurisprudence, 61 WASH. L. REV. 191, 194 (1986) (commenting that an
interest in privacy should be defined as "an interest in being left alone" and therefore a
search should be defined as "conduct that violates a social norm of privacy.").
258. Wilkins, supra note 22, at 1112 (quoting Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796,
810 (1984)(emphasis in original)).
259. BAXTER, supra note 122, at 48.
260. Mooney, 588 A.2d at 172-73 (Callahan, J., dissenting).
261. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353, supra Part II.B.
262. Id.
263. Id.
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place whose momentary occupants' expectations of freedom
from intrusion are recognized as reasonable. '264 The mere possi-
bility of another person discovering the defendant's home and
possessions should not diminish the defendant's expectation of
privacy in them, just as the possibility of a burglary in a tradi-
tional home does not defeat an expectation of privacy in that
home.26 As stated by the majority in Mooney, the defendant's
status as a trespasser should not be the determinative factor in
deciding whether his expectation of privacy in his possessions or
home was reasonable. 66 If it were the determinative factor, the
law of property would control Fourth Amendment analysis.
How should a court determine whether the defendant's ex-
pectation of privacy in his makeshift home and belongings was
reasonable? Unlike the dissent's inquiry of whether a "reasona-
ble" person would believe his belongings under a bridge were ac-
cessible to the public,267 the inquiry should turn to societal val-
ues and norms; what society views as reasonable for a person in
the defendant's circumstances. 26 8 The Fourth Amendment re-
flects a substantive right to personal security and freedom.26 9
This right is measured by asking whether a person's expectation
of privacy is one which society is prepared to accept as reasona-
264. Id. at 361, (Harlan, J., concurring) (citations omitted). See also Oliver v.
United States, 466 U.S. 170 (1984), where the court states that inquiry under the Fourth
Amendment must look to "whether the government's intrusion infringes upon the per-
sonal and societal values" protected by the Amendment. Id. at 182-83. The inquiry is not
"whether the individual chooses to conceal assertedly 'private' activity." Id.
265. See Hendrick v. United States, 922 F.2d 396 (7th Cir. 1991). In Hendrick, the
court noted that, "[t]he willingness of members of the public to trespass upon private
property in order to search through garbage cans cannot automatically defeat the fourth
amendment expectation of privacy any more than a series of burglaries could eliminate
any expectation of privacy in the home." Id. at 400.
266. Mooney, 588 A.2d at 154.
267. Id. at 172 (Callahan, J., dissenting).
268. See California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35 (1988), which provides support for an
inquiry into societal norms. Under such norms, the majority in Greenwood determined
that "it is common knowledge that plastic garbage bags left on or at the side of a public
street are readily accessible to animals, children, scavengers, snoops, and other members
of the public. Id. at 40 (footnotes omitted). The dissent in Greenwood also focused on
societal understandings, but reached a different conclusion, stating: "[s]crutiny of an-
other's trash is contrary to commonly accepted notions of civilized behavior." Id. at 45
(Brennan, J., dissenting).
269. See supra notes 1-5 and accompanying text.
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ble. 7 ° Privacy is:
a product of life in a human community, made possible through
the operation of socialization and social controls. The quantity
and quality of seclusion available to an individual or group are
socially and culturally determined, and in that sense society and
culture may be said to dictate what sorts of privacy one may rea-
sonably expect .... 271
Thus, to be reasonable, expectations of privacy must have a
source outside the Fourth Amendment, such as societal
norms. 272 These norms reflect "a set of necessary compromises
that define the limits of individual freedom and privacy. ' 2 73
Societal understandings of privacy and life in a human com-
munity are often mirrored in legislation and public policy, al-
though not perfectly.27 ' The statutory attention paid to the
homeless by the states and the federal government recognizes
homelessness as a societal problem.2 75 Unfortunately, the legisla-
tive mirror does not provide a perfect reflection of social norms
and understandings of the homelessness problem.2 76 For exam-
ple, some legislation indicates a frustration with the homeless-
ness crisis, attacking the homeless themselves instead of the
causes of homelessness. 2  Thus, one cannot only rely upon legis-
lation to determine the societal norms concerning homelessness.
The inquiry into societal norms implicitly involves a value
judgment concerning what actions are, or are not, accepted in a
270. See, e.g., Katz. v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967).
271. LAFAVE, supra note 15, at 312.
272. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143-44 n.12 (1978) (expectations of privacy ei-
ther founded in property law or societal norms).
273. Campbell, supra note 256, at 208.
274. Id. at 208 n.92.
275. See Stewart B. McKinney Homeless Assistance Act, Pub. L. No. 100-77, 101
Stat. 485(a) (1987) (codified at 42 U.S.C.A. § 11302(a) (West Supp. 1992)), supra notes
126-29 and accompanying text.
276. See Campbell, supra note 256, at 208 n.92.
277. Dunstan McNichol, Laws Attack Homeless, Group Says, STATES NEWS SER-
VICE, Dec. 17, 1991. Anti-homeless legislation can be found in many counties. This legis-
lation usually prohibits such activities as sleeping on sidewalks or public property. By
punishing a person "for not having an adequate place to sleep," the legislation "is
equivalent to punishing that individual for being homeless." Donald E. Baker, Comment,
"Anti-Homeless" Legislation: Unconstitutional Efforts to Punish the Homeless, 45 U.
MIAMI L.R. 417, 441-42 (1990-91) (emphasis in original).
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civilized society.278 For many of our nation's homeless popula-
tion like Mooney, the area under a bridge abutment is consid-
ered a "home. "279 Although not a traditional home, this "home
base" is the place where the individual "performs the usual
functions of sleeping, eating, and living. .. and a place to which
one . . . always intends to return. 28 0 Since the homeless are a
part of society, their notions of privacy should also enter into
the "reasonable expectation of privacy" equation. Too quickly
the homeless are ignored because the homeless make many peo-
ple uncomfortable. As one commentator noted, "they 'evoke our
pity and a tangle of other disquieting emotions: anger, frustra-
tion, fear, and a lingering malaise' that the American dream may
be starting to fade away. " s281 The same commentator also de-
scribed the public's view of the homeless in a more graphic man-
ner: "[F]or many of us, the homeless are shit, and our policies
toward them, our spontaneous sense of disgust and horror, our
wish to be rid of them - all of this has hidden in it, close to its
heart, our feelings about excrement. 2 82 However, it is important
to remember that the homeless' notions of privacy and liberty
are the same as the non-homeless public's. 28 3 Indeed, this is the
reason why the homeless are often offended by conditions in
278. See, e.g., Greenwood, 486 U.S. at 45-46 (Brennan, J., dissenting), supra note
265. See generally, Campbell, supra note 256, at 207-08. One commentator notes that:
"social norms of privacy are not a detailed and idealized code of etiquette. Of necessity,
norms of privacy must be general principles to which nearly all members of society sub-
scribe." Id. at 208.
,279. A New York Court has acknowledged these homes in the context of voting
rights. The Southern District of New York decided that the stringent "domicile" stan-
dard under New York's election law was satisfied if a homeless person could identify a
"home base" to which he/she regularly returned. Pitts v. Black, 608 F. Supp. 696, 710
(S.D.N.Y. 1984). Thus, a non-traditional residence was not reasonable ground for deny-
ing a homeless person the right to vote. Similarly, a non-traditional residence should not
be a reasonable ground for denying a homeless person Fourth Amendment protection.
280. Pitts, 608 F. Supp. at 698.
281. BARAK, supra note 118, at 11 (quoting MARJORIE HOPE & JAMES YOUNG, THE
FACES OF HOMELESSNESS 28 (1986)).
282. Id. at 11-12 (quoting Peter Main, Helping and Hating the Homeless: The
Struggle at the Margins of America, HARPER'S MAGAZINE, Jan. 1987, at 47).
283. Society must not allow its frustration over the apparent intractability of the
homeless problem to undermine our societal values, such as the right to privacy. See
generally Marsha Mercer, A "Compassion Fatigued" Nation Hardens its Heart to the
Homeless, CHICAGO TRIBUNE, Dec. 26, 1991, at 27 (reporting on backlash of anti-homeless
attitudes as the number of homeless has increased in the nation's cities).
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shelters and why shelters are often a last-ditch alternative.284
The defendant in Mooney settled for a bridge abutment
which provided more, not less, privacy for him and his belong-
ings than a shelter.2 85 Realistically, since the defendant had no-
where else to safeguard his belongings, it is clear that he did not
abandon his privacy interestin them in the same manner as one
who has a house but "stashes" his belongings temporarily under
a bridge for a day. The defendant created a "zone of privacy ' '"
by hiding his possessions within the duffle bag and cardboard
box which contained his belongings.287 The majority recognized
and respected this zone of privacy by affording it Fourth
Amendment protection.288
However, the defendant also created a zone of privacy in the
area under the bridge by hiding his belongings under the girders
and returning to it every night.281 9 This zone of privacy was not
recognized by the majority. 290 The area under the bridge is con-
ceptually linked with intimacy and personal privacy, both of
which are protected by the Fourth Amendment.2 91 Most of the
public has viewed the various "homes" created by the homeless
and would refrain from venturing into one in recognition of its
status as a "home." Most of the public would respect a homeless
individual's privacy because of the social understanding of the
privacy associated with homes.
By refusing to recognize an expectation of privacy in the
area under the bridge, however, the majority opinion failed to
adequately reflect societal norms regarding the unique difficul-
ties encountered by homeless persons trying to secure that "last
shred of privacy from the prying eyes of outsiders .. ,."29l Thus,
if an individual has created a home for himself in order to ob-
284. See supra notes 137-45 and accompanying text.
285. While in jail, Mr. Mooney expressed his feelings about the area under the
bridge to a reporter: "I didn't feel homeless .... I felt at home." David Margolick,
Poverty and Privacy: Home, Sweet Niche?, N.Y. TiMEs, Nov. 17, 1990 at 25 (Late
Edition).
286. See Wilkins, supra note 22, at 1112.
287. See Brief of Defendant-Appellant, supra note 151, at 3-4.
288. Connecticut v. Mooney, 588 A.2d 145, 161 (1991).
289. Id. at 150-51.
290. Id. at 152.
291. See Wilkins, supra note 22, at 1112; see also supra Part II.D.
292. Mooney, 588 A.2d at 161.
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tain some privacy and secure belongings, and the area is clearly
recognizable by a reasonable person as a home conveying an ex-
pectation of privacy,93 the individual has created a "zone of pri-
vacy" into which the police should not intrude without a war-
rant.9 4 Only in this way will the spirit of the Fourth
Amendment be realized, "for . . . the most frail cottage in the
kingdom is absolutely entitled to the same guarantees of privacy
"1295as the most majestic mansion ....
V. Conclusion
The expansive protection of the constitutional values of lib-
erty and privacy under the Fourth Amendment, 29 6 established in
Katz v. United States,97 is being denied to a significant seg-
ment of the American population, the homeless. The Fourth
Amendment protects these values when a person has a tradi-
293. The home must be recognizable as a "home" so that the law enforcement offi-
cials are able to determine where they can and cannot enter without a warrant.
294. This recognition of the privacy associated with a makeshift home does not im-
ply an acceptance of homelessness as an incurable situation. The advocacy to end home-
lessness must continue; no one deserves to be without a home.
A recent United States District Court decision addressed the constitutional rights of
the homeless. In Pottinger, et. al. v. Miami, No. 88-2406, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17640
(S.D. Fla. Nov. 16, 1992), the court noted that Miami's practice of arresting the homeless
for engaging in basic activities of daily life, including sleeping and eating in public, and
seizing the personal property of the homeless violated various constitutional protections,
including the Fourth Amendment. Id. at *106-07. The court emphasized that, "except
for a fortunate few, most homeless individuals have no alternative to living in public
areas." Id. at *18.
The court also found that the homeless "exhibited a subjective expectation of pri-
vacy in their belongings," and concluded that society was prepared to recognize the ex-
pectations as reasonable. Id. at *62, *64-68 (discussing Connecticut v. Mooney, 588 A.2d
145, cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 330 (1991)). The court also noted that it had previously
found that property belonging to the homeless was "reasonably identifiable by its ap-
pearance and its organization in a particular area, [and] . . . that homeless individuals
often arrange their property in a manner which suggests ownership." Id. at *64 (citing
the court's March 18, 1991 order, which found the city of Miami in civil contempt of the
court's earlier April 26, 1990 order). The court further determined that "[s]uch charac-
teristics make the property of homeless persons reasonably distinguishable from truly
abandoned property." Id. at *63.
295. United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 822 (1982).
296. See Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 186 (1984) (Marshall, J., dissenting)
("The Fourth Amendment ... was designed.., to identify a fundamental human liberty
that should be shielded forever from government intrusion.").
297. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
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tional home.298 Unfortunately, today's society consists of many
persons without traditional homes. Thus, the Amendment
should also protect the personal privacy interests of those citi-
zens too unfortunate to afford traditional shelter.
The problems of the homeless, although a local concern,
have national ramifications. The homeless population is growing,
with no end in sight.299 At some point, the United States Su-
preme Court will be forced to address the Fourth Amendment
rights of the homeless. The Connecticut Supreme Court has
taken the first step in acknowledging the Fourth Amendment
right of a homeless individual in his possessions, when the pos-
sessions are within closed containers located in the area that the
individual calls "home." This first step, however, is a very small
one. Societal understandings of the privacy associated with a
home must be translated into an expectation of privacy for the
homeless individual in the place he considers his "home." As the
majority in Mooney stated: "[to] conclude otherwise . . . would
come dangerously close to bringing to fruition the famous ironic
reference of Anatole France to 'the majestic equality of the laws
which forbid rich and poor alike to sleep under bridges, to beg in
the streets, and to steal bread.' "300
Teryl Smith Eisenberg*
298. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
299. See supra notes 120-25 and accompanying text.
300. Mooney, 588 A.2d at 161 (quoting ANATOLE FRANCE, THE RED LILY 91 (Ste-
phens trans. 1925)). The defendant was released from jail upon the majority's finding
that the defendant's expectation of privacy in his duffle bag and cardboard box was rea-
sonable. Mr. Mooney was found dead in a New Haven park on November 5th, 1992.
Edmund Mahoney, Man In Privacy Case For Homelss Dies, HARTFORD COURANT, No-
vember 13, 1992 at Cl (discussing Connecticut v. Mooney).
* The author wishes to thank David Greene and Mario Castellitto for their invalua-
ble comments on, and criticism of, each draft of this casenote. The author also wishes to
thank her parents for never letting her forget what others do not have.
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